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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF
:
HUMAN SERVICES. OFFICE OF RECOVERY
SERVICES. and CHILD SUPPORT
:
ENFORCEMENT,
Plaintiffs and Appellant
and Appellee,

:

v.

:

Case No. 930804-CA

REYES VALENTINO CORDOVA,

:

Priority 15

Defendant.

:
BRIEF OF APPELLANT ORS
JURISDICTION

Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred by Utah Code Ann. §
78-2a-3(2)(d) (Supp. 1993).
STATUTES INVOLVED
The

following

statutes

determination of this appeal:

and

rules

are

relevant

to

the

Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-7 (Supp.

1993); Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(4) (1992); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-6
(1992); Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-8, -9 (1992); Utah Code Ann. §§ 7845a-2, -5 (1992); Utah Code Ann. § 62A-9-121 (1989); and Utah Code
Ann. § 30-3-5 (Supp. 1993).

The full text of these provisions is

set forth as Addendum A.
ISSUE PRESENTED/STANDARD OF REVIEW
Does a circuit court have subject matter jurisdiction of an
independent civil action to collect past due child support ordered
by a district court in a divorce, support, or paternity action?

This

issue

presents

a

question

of

correctness with no deference accorded

law,

reviewed

for

to the trial court's

determination. Burns Chiropractic Clinic v. Allstate Ins. Co., 851
P.2d 1209, 1211 (Utah App. 1993);

Rimensburger v. Rimensburaer.

841 P.2d 709, 710 (Utah App. 1992).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE/STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
This civil action was filed in the Third Circuit Court, West
Valley

Department,

collection

agency,

defendant Cordova.

by

Child

to

collect

R. 9-10.

Support
past

Enforcement,
due

child

a

private

support1

from

The defendant is a noncustodial

natural parent whose monthly child support obligation was fixed and
ordered by a Utah district court judge in June 1989 in a paternity
proceeding.

R. 13-15.

At CSE's request, appellant Office of Recovery

Services

("ORS") was ordered joined as a party plaintiff pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-45-9(2) (1992) because the custodial parent, CSE's
purported assignor, had received public assistance from the State
of Utah.2

R. 69-70 (Order, attached as Addendum B) .

ORS had

x

The complaint
sought less than the circuit court
jurisdictional cap of $20,000. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-7 (Supp.
1993) .
2

The statute provides:

(2) (a)
A person may not commence any action or file a
pleading to establish or modify a support obligation or
to recover support due or owing, whether under this
chapter or any other applicable statute, without filing
an affidavit with the court at the time the action is
commenced or the pleading is filed stating whether public
assistance has been or is being provided on behalf of a
dependent child of the person commencing the action or
filing the pleading.
2

opposed compulsory joinder on the basis that the circuit court has
no subject matter jurisdiction to enforce a claim for past due
child support ordered by a district court.

R. 27-38.

The Honorable William A. Thorne rejected

this argument,

concluding that the circuit court has subject matter jurisdiction
over actions to enforce district court orders for child support
once payment is past due. R. 61-68 (Decision, attached as Addendum
C) . He concluded that once a district court-ordered child support
payment is past due, it changes from a child support obligation
into a "debt" owed by the noncustodial parent.

Such a debt, he

reasoned, can be sued on in an independent civil action in the
circuit court just like any other debt, as long as the amount
claimed

is below the circuit court's monetary

jurisdictional

ceiling. R. 64-65; Addendum C at 4-5. The circuit court can enter
a money judgment in this debt action; however, relying in part on
Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(4) (1992),3 Judge Thorne concluded that the
circuit court lacks the power to enforce a district court's child
support order through the use of contempt orders.

R. 63-64;

Addendum C at 3-4.
Following involuntary joinder of ORS, a $13,866 money judgment
was entered in the Third Circuit Court in favor of CSE and against
defendant Cordova for past due child support payments, accrued
(b) If public assistance has been or is being provided,
that person shall join the [Office of Recovery Services]
as a party to the action.
3

This statute gives every court the authority to "compel
obedience to its judgments, orders, and process. . . in a pending
action or proceeding." (Emphasis added).
3

interest, and court costs. R. 110.
ORS timely appealed from the judgment in order to obtain from
this Court a resolution of the important jurisdictional question.4
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Utah Legislature has expressly barred the circuit courts
from considering claims for unpaid child support that arise from a
district court's order in a divorce, support, or paternity action.
Those actions are wisely centralized by the legislature under the
exclusive

jurisdiction

of

the

district

courts,

which

have

continuing jurisdiction to oversee the collection of past due child
support that they have originally ordered after taking into account
all the circumstances of the parties.
In this case, the circuit court erroneously concluded that
once payment is past due, a claim for monthly child support is
severed from the original district court action from which the
support order arose, becoming instead a generic "debt" to the
custodial parent.

Such a debt can be sued on in an independent

civil action in circuit court, according to the circuit court, if
the total claim is less than that court's monetary jurisdictional
cap.

A money judgment is available in the circuit court action;
4

0ther ORS appeals from the same ruling by Circuit Court
Edward Watson on the jurisdictional issue are currently pending
before this court as State of Utah, Dep't of Human Services, Office
of Recovery Services and Child Support Enforcement v. Lee Allen
Richards et al.. No. 930654-CA.
The separate, but related, issue of whether the custodial
parent's right to enforce a district court's child support order
can be assigned to a third party other than ORS is already before
this Court in State ex. rel. Parker v. Ferran, No. 930033-CA,
currently on temporary remand to district court for entry of
findings and conclusions.
4

however, contempt is not available in circuit court to compel
compliance with the district court's child support order.
This Court should reject the trial court's conclusion on both
statutory and public policy grounds.

A claim for child support

that arises from a prior district court support order does not lose
its nature as such the moment it becomes past due.

The subject

matter of the action is still child support originally ordered by
a

district

court, over which only the district

courts have

jurisdiction under Utah law.
In addition to being prohibited by Utah's statutory scheme,
the splintering of a continuing claim for monthly, district courtordered child support into multiple causes of action in multiple
courts and court systems would be contrary to sensible public
policy.

It would increase the costs of child support litigation

for all parties, including the State, waste judicial resources, and
add confusion to the collection process, further thwarting all
efforts to assure that natural parents financially provide for
their children.
ARGUMENT
I.

UTAH LAW VESTS THE DISTRICT COURT WITH
EXCLUSIVE JURISDICTION OVER CLAIMS FOR PAST
DUE CHILD SUPPORT ORDERED BY A DISTRICT COURT,
AND IT EXPRESSLY PROHIBITS THE CIRCUIT COURT
FROM EXERCISING JURISDICTION OVER SUCH CLAIMS.

The jurisdictional limits of a statutorily-created court, such
as

the

circuit

court,

are

circumscribed

by

its

empowering

legislation. R. v. Whitmer In and For Salt Lake County, 30 Utah 2d
206, 515 P.2d 617 (1973); Thompson v. Jackson, 743 P.2d 1230, 1232

I

(Utah App. 1987) . Without jurisdiction over the subject matter, a
court

is without

authority

to proceed

to

the merits

of a

controversy, and any judgment or order entered by that court is
null and void. Thompson, 743 P.2d at 1232; Van Per Stappen v. Van
Per Stappen. 815 P.2d 1335, 1337 (Utah App. 1991) .
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3-4(1) (1992), the district
court has broad "original jurisdiction in all matters civil and
criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and not prohibited
by law." Accord Herzoa v. Bramwell. 82 Utah 216, 23 P.2d 345, 348
(1933).

No such broad authority has been conferred, by Utah's

Constitution

or statutes, upon the circuit

courts.

On the

contrary, the Utah Legislature has substantially restricted, by
subject matter as well as by amount in controversy, the circuit
court's authority to entertain civil actions:
The circuit court has civil jurisdiction, both law and
equity, in all matters if the sum claimed in less than
$20,000 . . . except:
(2) in actions of divorce, child custody, and paternity;
. . . and
(6) in all other actions, where, by statute, jurisdiction
is exclusively vested in the district court or other
trial or appellate court.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-4-7 (Supp. 1993) (emphasis added).
Further demonstrating the clear legislative intent to withhold
from circuit courts any authority to consider child support claims
regardless of amount, every statute relating to the imposition of
or enforcement of a parent's obligation to support his or her child
vests exclusive subject matter jurisdiction in the district court.
Utah Code Ann. §§ 30-3-1 to -37 (provision of statute regulating
6

divorce proceedings, section 30-3-5, gives district court authority
to enter orders relating to child support as well as continuing
jurisdiction to modify such orders); Uniform Civil Liability for
Support Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45-1 to -12 (section 78-45-6
grants district court jurisdiction of all proceedings brought under
this act) ; Uniform Act on Paternity, Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-45a-l to
-17 (under section 78-45a-5(l), district court has jurisdiction of
an action to establish paternity and power to enforce a judgment
for child support, with continuing jurisdiction to modify or revoke
such judgment) ; Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, Utah
Code Ann. §§ 77-31-1 to -39 (section 77-31-10 vests jurisdiction of
all proceedings under this act in the district court) ; see also
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-10.6 (1) (a) (Supp. 1993) (each payment under
a child support order is, on and after the date due, "a judgment
with the same attributes and effect of any judgment of a district
court"); Utah Code Ann. § 78-7-5(4)

(1992)

(each court has

authority to enforce its own judgments and orders in a pending
case); Public Support of Children Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-11-301
to -504 (1993) (authorizing enforcement of ORS's administrative
support order, under section 62A-11-311(1), by filing an abstract
of it "with the clerk of any district court in the state").
Thus, section 78-4-7(2) expressly prohibits the circuit court
from exercising jurisdiction over claims that arise from actions
for divorce or paternity, which are different vehicles for securing
court orders that mandate payment of child support by natural

7

parents.5

In addition, the other statutes cited affirmatively

place exclusive jurisdiction over claims for child support in the
district

courts--whether

divorce,

support,

or

they arise there

paternity

in the context of

proceedings--thereby

creating

another insurmountable bar to circuit court jurisdiction over such
claims by virtue of section 78-4-7(6),
II.

A CLAIM FOR RECOVERY OF CHILD SUPPORT PAYMENTS
ORDERED BY A DISTRICT COURT DOES NOT--FOR
PURPOSES OF DETERMINING THE CIRCUIT COURT'S
SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION--CEASE BEING PART
OF THAT DISTRICT COURT ACTION ONCE THE
PAYMENTS BECOME PAST DUE.

Notwithstanding

this

comprehensive

statutory

scheme

for

handling child support matters only in the district courts,6 the
circuit court determined it could concurrently exercise a limited
form of subject matter jurisdiction over some claims for child
support by distinguishing between future and past due child
support.

The court ignored the plain language of both exceptions

to circuit court jurisdiction in section 78-4-7 by erroneously
characterizing district court-ordered child support payments--once

5

Utah's prohibition of circuit courts from enforcing child
support orders, or other financial obligations arising from a
divorce or paternity action, is apparently typical. See 67A C.J.S.
Parent and Child § 80 at 402 (1978) (absent statutory
authorization, courts of limited jurisdiction may not enforce
provisions of separation agreements, divorce decrees, or judgments
of paternity and may not compel payment of child support or grant
money judgments for past support expenditures).
*CSE has agreed before this Court that the statutes give
district court sole subject matter jurisdiction over claims for
past due child support. Brief of Appellant CSE at 22-25, State ex
rel. Parker v. Ferran, 930033-CA; see note 4, supra.
CSE
nonetheless continues to argue the opposite view in the circuit
court. R. 98; Addendum C at 5.
8

past due--as no longer part of the district court divorce or
paternity action in which the child support orders were entered.
R. 64; Addendum C at 4.

Instead, monthly child support payments

transform on their due dates from child support claims into
ordinary "debts" for a fixed amount, collectable in a circuit court
action like any other contractual debt, as long as the sum claimed
is less than the circuit court's monetary jurisdictional ceiling.
R. 65; Addendum C at 5.7
The sole basis for this transmogrification of the child
support obligation is the following language in Bagcrs v. Anderson,
528 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah 1974) (emphasis added):
[S]upport money can fall into two separate categories:
First, the current and ongoing right of a child to
receive support money from his father (parent); and
second, the right to receive reimbursement for support of
a child after that has been done. As to the second,
suppose a father (parent) fails over a period of time to
furnish support of the child, and the mother, or someone
else furnishes it. That person then has a right to claim
reimbursement from the parent, the same as any other past
debt. This right of reimbursement belongs to whoever
fsicl furnished the support; and it is subject to
negotiation, settlement, satisfaction or discharge in the
same manner as any other debt.
See R. 65; Addendum C at 5.

This dicta does not support the

circuit court's ruling on the jurisdictional issue here.

As is

evident from the complaint filed in the instant case, this is not
an independent action for reimbursement of past support supplied.
This is an action seeking to enforce a district court's support
order that inextricably remains part of the original paternity
7

The parties would, in Judge Thome's view, have to return to
the original district court action to enforce the child support
obligation through a contempt proceeding. R. 63; Addendum C at 3.
9

proceeding,

over which

the district

court

has

original

and

continuing jurisdiction and power to compel compliance with its
orders.

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45a-5(l) (Supp. 1993); Utah Code

Ann. § 78-7-5(4) (1992) .
The characterization of unpaid, district court-ordered child
support as a "debt" owed to a support provider is irrelevant to
resolution of the jurisdictional issue. Describing accrued child
support as a debt does not change the fact that the subject matter
of an action on such a debt is child support ordered by a district
court, a matter over which section 78-4-7 precludes the circuit
court from exercising any jurisdiction.8
In Herzocr, 23 P.2d at 347-48, the Utah Supreme Court held in
a mandamus action that the district court must assume jurisdiction
over a petition to enforce the alimony payment terms of a prior
district court divorce decree, even though resolution of the
petition would require the district court to rule on the validity
of the parties' purported post-decree contractual settlement of
those past due alimony claims.

"[A] district court, having

acquired jurisdiction of subject-matter and of the parties, has
jurisdiction in the same action of all disputes and controversies
presented by the pleadings arising out of or connected with the
same subject-matter of the action."
McNeil, 126 F.2d 841, 843

Id. at 348; accord Emrich v.

(D.C. Cir. 1942)

e

(district court's

The Public Support of Children Act, which authorizes ORS to
enter administrative judgments for past due child support and then
abstract them in the district court, likewise uses the term
"support debt" to mean "the debt created by nonpayment of support."
Utah Code Ann. § 62A 11-303(19) (1993).
10

jurisdiction over parties' prior divorce continued so that it, not
inferior court, had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate
subsequent child support claim).
This Court should similarly hold that child support claims
arising out of or connected with original paternity, support, or
divorce proceedings in district court must, under Utah's statutory
scheme, be settled in the context of the prior judicial action in
district court, not in an independent action in circuit court. The
circuit

court's

intervention

order

and

judgment

should,

accordingly, be vacated as null and void.
This result is compelled by serious practical and public
policy concerns as well as by the cited statutes.

The ruling of

the circuit court in the instant case hopelessly fractionalizes a
single domestic proceeding for paternity in one district court into
multiple causes of action that can be filed in numerous circuit
courts.

Under Judge Thome's reasoning, each past due monthly

payment of court-ordered support during a child's years of minority
can be a separate debt action in a circuit court, filed by the
custodial parent and/or by ORS.9

(On the other hand, either the

custodial parent or ORS may elect to accumulate claims for more
than $20,000 in support arrearages, in which case Judge Thome's
ruling would apparently require the filing of a new, independent

9

Utah law grants ORS standing, independent of the custodial
parent's, to enforce the right to child support as an initiating or
intervening party in a divorce, support, or paternity proceeding
against the support obligor. Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-9 (1992) ; id. ,
§ 78-45a-2 (1992); Ad^, § 78-45a-5 (Supp. 1993); i£^ § 62A-11-104
(1993) .
11

"debt" action in district court, not circuit court.)

However, if

the custodial parent or ORS wants a court to hold the obligor in
contempt for failure to pay child support, s/he or ORS must go back
to the original action in district court.
This fractionalization of what is, essentially, a single—but
ongoing--cause of action for child support is nonsensical. It also
needlessly increases the costs of support litigation for the
parties, including both parents and ORS, who must appear and
respond in two (or more) separate forums in multiple lawsuits.
Permitting a new and separate action in circuit court to enforce a
district court's prior order, in contravention of section 78-75(4), also wastes public judicial resources through duplicative
filings in separate courts and court systems.
Other practical considerations militate against recognizing
any concurrent jurisdiction in the circuit court over child support
matters. For example, support obligors (or their garnishees) would
be subject to multiple, potentially overlapping post-judgment
garnishment or attachment orders or judgment liens emanating from
two different court systems.
any

such

circuit

court

There is no method for reconciling

judgments

and post-judgment

judicial

remedies relating to past-due support with those entered in the
original district court action or with those abstracted in district
court as ORS's administrative child support orders. Thus, it will
be nearly impossible for either court, or for ORS, the custodial
parent, or the support obligor to keep track accurately of what
months of support have been reduced to a court judgment or a court12

abstracted agency order, as well as what months of arrearages have
or have not been paid up.

This chaos will, in turn, further

handicap efforts to collect child support from delinquent parents.
Just as importantly, a district court in a divorce, support,
or paternity action, in exercise of its continuing jurisdiction and
its power to enforce its own judgments or orders, must be able to
enter judgments for support arrearages and subsequent equitable
orders concerning execution on those judgments after taking a
holistic view of the parties' obligations, duties, interests, and
resources. For example, a district court may stay execution on its
judgment for past due support as long as an obligor of limited
means timely pays ongoing child support plus an extra amount each
month toward the arrearages. Harmon v. Harmon, 26 Utah 2d 436, 491
P.2d 231 (1971) (district court exercising continuing jurisdiction
in divorce action has discretion to restrict execution on judgments
for support arrearages to prevent the destruction of the means for
payment of ongoing support). Similar authority and flexibility is
given to the district court in support and paternity actions. Utah
Code Ann, § 78-45-8

(1992) (under Uniform Civil Liability for

Support Act, district court retains jurisdiction to modify or
vacate orders of support "where justice requires"); Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45a-5(l)

(Supp. 1993)

(under Uniform Act on Paternity,

district court has continuing jurisdiction "to modify or revoke a
judgment for . . . necessary support")•
If an obligee is permitted to obtain from circuit court a
rubber-stamped judgment for an excised period of past due child
13

support, the district courts in the original proceedings will lose
this essential flexibility.

They will, in effect, be divested of

their statutory powers to make equitable orders regarding support
of a child and to compel compliance with their own judgments or
orders in pending cases.
In light of such realities, the appellate court in Emrich
sagely determined that sound public policy required a district
court with original jurisdiction over a parties7 divorce--not an
inferior municipal court in an independent action--to resolve all
post-decree child support claims.

126 F.2d at 844.

In reaching

this conclusion, the court aptly noted, "No advantage to the
parents, to the minor child, or to the well being of the people of
the District could be accomplished by permitting such splitting up
of issues . . . ."

Id. at 845.

In sum, the circuit court's exercise of limited, concurrent
jurisdiction

over child

support

collection

in Utah would be

contrary to current law and would constitute undesirable public
policy that would further hinder recovery of support from natural
parents, adding confusion and cost to an already complicated area.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, ORS requests that this Court vacate
as null and void the final judgment and intervention order appealed
from, and remand this case to the Third Circuit Court with
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instructions that the complaint be dismissed for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction.
Respectfully submitted this $£U day of April 1994.

BILLY WALKER (3358)
ANNINA M. MITCHELL (2274)
Assistant Attorneys General
Attorneys for ORS
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, with first-class
postage prepaid, two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellant ORS
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Michael Barker
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#112 Metropolitan Law Bldg.
431 South 300 Ea8t
Salt Lake City, \JT 84111

Craig Cook
Attorney for Appellee CSE
3645 East 3100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84109

Reyes Cordova
1516 Concord
Salt Lake City, \JT 84104

^ L ^ ^ ( ^6^AXV

15

ADDENDUM A:

Text of Relevant Statutes

78-4-7

JUDICIAL CODE

Hialory: C. 1»53,7*3*103, «n»ctod by L.

co o c o c <
C € - C C #
>OCCC(ll

" S n t t t A c t L ^ f c e * - 63-55-278 provide,
that the Citixen Review Panel Pilot Project is
repealed April 1, 1995.

CHAPTER 4
CIRCUIT COURTS

crcc-»

GOGCCCI
G« CCCt
" CC CC.3I
"OfGOOCI

Effective Dates. — Laws 1993, ch. 173, « 6
makes the act effective on July 1, 1993.

Section
78-4-7.
784-11.

Section
784-19.
Civil jurisdiction — .Exceptions.
Appeals to Court of Appeals — 78-4-23.
Prosecuting attorney to repre- 784-24.
sent state — City attorney to
represent municipality.

Repealed.
Remission of monies collected.
Repealed.

78-4-7. Civil jurisdiction — Exceptions.
The circuit court has civil jurisdiction, both law and equity, in all matters if
the sum claimed is less than $20,000, exclusive of court costs, interest, and
attorney fees, except:
(1) in actions to determine the title to real property, but not excluding
actions to foreclose mechanics liens;
(2) in actions of divorce, child custody, and paternity;
(3) in actions under the Utah Uniform Probate Code;
(4) in actions to review the decisions of any state administrative
agency, board, council, commission, or hearing officer;
(5) in actions seeking remedies in the form of extraordinary writs; and
(6) in all other actions where, by statute, jurisdiction is exclusively
vested
the784-7,
district
courtby
or L.
other trial or appellate court.
History: C.in1953,
enacted

1977, ch. 77,1 1? 1983, ch. 76,1 1; 1986, ch. Amendment Notes. — The 1992 amend121, I 1; 1988, ch. 248,1 81; 1991, ch. 368,ment, effective April 27,1992, inserted "interest, and attorney fees** in the undesignated inI SI; 1992, ch. 127, I IS.
troductory language.

otooocl

I OOGGOf<
CIGCCi

COC GCOI
CICOCO
i O CO-CO

ctecci

y

78*4-11. Appeals to Court of Appeals — Prosecuting attorney to represent state — City attorney to represent municipality.
Except as otherwise directed by Section 78-2*2, appealsfromfinalcivil and
criminal judgments of the circuit courts are to the Court of Appeals. The
county attorney or district attorney as provided under Sections 17-18-1 and
17-18-1.7 shall represent the interests of the state as public prosecutor in any
appeals of criminal matters prosecuted by the county attorney in the circuit
court. City attorneys shall represent the interests of the state in any appeals
of criminal matters prosecuted by the city attorney and the interests of municipalities in any appeals involving violations of municipal ordinances.

54

GENERAL PROVISIONS APPLICABLE TO COURTS AND JUDGES

78-7-5

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. J u r . 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts § 36.
C.J.S. - 21 CJ.S. Courts § 121.
ATT>
r<ir^*x_
i . i x.
/••.
A.L.R. - Effect of ^ t o e s s violation of order
of exclusion, 14 A.L.R.3d 16.
Standing of media representatives or organizations to seek review of, or to intervene to

oppose, order closing criminal proceedings to
P u ^ic, 74 A X J U t h 476.
Prejudicial effect of improper failure to exd u d e {rom C0UTtT00m
o r to sequester or sepawitnesses in criminal case, 74
n t e g^^'s
A.L.R.4th 705.
Key Numbers. — Courts *» 79.

78-7-5. Powers of every court.
Every court has authority to:
(1) preserve and enforce order in its immediate presence;
(2) enforce order in the proceedings before it, or before a person authorized to conduct a judicial investigation under its authority;
(3) provide for the orderly conduct of proceedings before it or its officers;
(4) compel obedience to its judgments, orders, and process, and to the
orders of a judge out of court, in a pending action or proceeding;
(5) control in furtherance of justice the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial
proceeding before it in every matter;
(6) compel the attendance of persons to testify in a pending action or
proceeding, as provided by law;
(7) administer oaths in a pending action or proceeding, and in all other
cases where necessary in the exercise of its authority and duties;
(8) amend and control its process and orders to conform to law and
justice;
(9) devise and make new process and forms of proceedings, consistent
with law, necessary to carry into effect its authority and jurisdiction; and
(10) enforce rules of the Supreme Court and Judicial Council.
History: L. 1951, ch. 68, I 1; C. 1943,
Supp., 104-7-5; L. 1988, ch. 248, $ 41.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25, 1988, added Subsection (10) and made minor stylistic changes
throughout.

Cross-References. — Acknowledgments,
power to take, § 57-2a-3.
Contempt generally, § 78-32-1 et seq.
Power to solemnize marriages, § 30-1-6.
Subpoenas, §§ 78-24-4 to 78-24-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Vacating orders.
Order of district court finding mother in contempt and suspending child support is valid

and cannot be vacated by the order of another
district judge nine years later. Peterson v. Petenon, 530 P.2d 821 (Utah 1974).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 20 Am. Jur. 2d Courts f 64
et seq.
C.J.S. — 17 CJ.S. Contempt § 43.
AX.R. — Interference with enforcement of
judgment in criminal or juvenile delinquent
case as contempt, 8 A.L.R.3d 657.
Release of information concerning forthcom-

ing or pending trial as ground for contempt
proceedings or other disciplinary measures
against member of the bar, 11 A.L.R.3d 1104.
Appealability of acquittal from or dismissal
ofchargeofcontemptofcourt,24 A.L.R.3d650.
Appealability of contempt adjudication or
conviction, 33 AX.R.3d 448.
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78-45-5

JUDICIAL CODE

78-45-5. Duty of obligor regardless of presence or residence of obligee.
An obligor present or resident in this state has the duty of support as
defined in this act regardless of the presence or residence of the obligee.
History: L. 1957, ch- 110, | 5.
Meaning of "ihiB act" — See note under
same catchlinc following t 76-45-1.
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. JUT. 2d. — 23 Am. Jur. 2d Desertion
and Nonsupport S§ 32, 95.

Key Numbers. — Husband and Wife *» 4;
Parent and Child •» 3.1(5).

78-45-6. District court jurisdiction.
The district court shall have jurisdiction of all proceedings brought under
this act.
History: L. 1957, ch. 110, I 6.
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction
of district court, S 76-3-4.

Meaning of "this act" — See note under
same catchline following I 78-45-1.

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. —20 Am. Jur. 2d Court* 5 147
et seq.
Key Numbers. — Courts *» 156.

78-45-7. Determination of amount of support — Rebuttable guidelines.
(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the amount granted by prior court
order unless there has been a material change of circumstance on the part of
the obligor or obligee.
(2) If no prior court order exists, or a material change in circumstances has
occurred, the court determining the amount of prospective support shall require each party to file a proposed award of child support using the guidelines
before an order awarding .child support or modifying an existing award may
be granted.
(3) If the court finds sufficient evidence to rebut the guidelines, the court
shall establish support after considering all relevant factors, including but not
limited to:
(a) the standard of living and situation of the parties;
(b) the relative wealth and income of the parties;
(c) the ability of the obligor to earn;
(d) the ability of the obligee to earn;
(e) the needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
(f) the ages of the parties; and
(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of
others.
660

UNIFORM CIVIL LIABILITY FOR SUPPORT ACT

78-45-9

78*45-8. Continuing jurisdiction.
The court shall retain jurisdiction to modify or vacate the order of support
where justice requires.
History: L. 1957, eh. 110, I 8.
Cross-References. — General jurisdiction
of district court, i 78-3-4.

78-45-9. Enforcement of right of support.
(1) (a) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor, and
the office may proceed pursuant to this chapter or any other applicable
statute, either on behalf of the Department of Human Services or any
other department or agency of this state that provides public assistance,
as defined by Subsection 62A-11-303C3), to enforce the right to recover
public assistance, or on behalf of the obligee, to enforce the obligee's right
of support against the obligor.
(b) Whenever any court action is commenced by the office to enforce
payment of the obligor's support obligation, it shall be the duty of the
attorney general or the county attorney of the county of residence of the
obligee to represent the office.
(2) (a) A person may not commence any action or file a pleading to establish or modify a support obligation or to recover support due or owing,
whether under this chapter or any other applicable statute, without filing
an affidavit with the court at the time the action is commenced or the
pleading is filed stating whether public assistance has been or is being
provided on behalf of a dependent child of the person commencing the
action or filing the pleading.
(b) If public assistance has been or is being provided, that person shall
join the office as a party to the action. The office shall be represented as
provided in Subsection (l)(b).
(3) As used in this section "office" means the Office of Recovery Services
within the Department of Human Services.
History: L. 1957, ch, 110, f 9; 1975, ch, 96,
§ 23; 1977, ch, 145, S 11; 1982, ch, 63, t 2;
19S9, ch, 62, I 23; 1990, ch, 1S3, I 59.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective April 24, 1989, designated the
first sentence of Subsection (1) as QXa) and
rewrote the provision which read: "The obligee
may enforce his right of support against the
obligor and the ftate Department of Social Services may proceed pursuant to this act or any
other applicable statute, either on its behalf or
on behalf of the obligee to enforce the obligee's
right of support against the obligor"; designated the second sentence of Subsection (1) as
(1Kb) and substituted "office" for "state department of social services" and "the office" lor
"that department" therein; designated the first
sentence of Subsection (2) as (2Xa) and rewrote
the provision which read: "No obligee shall
commence any action to recover support due or

owing that obligee whether under this act or
any other applicable statute without first filing
an affidavit with the court at the time the action is commenced stating whether that obligee has received public assistance from any
source"; designated the second and third senfences of Subsection (2) as (2Kb) and rewrote
the provision which read: I f the obligee has
received public assistance, the obligee shall
join the Department of Social Services as a
party plaintiff in the action. The Department
of Social Services shall be represented as provided in Subsection (1) of this section"; and
added Subsection (3).
The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,
1990, substituted "Human Services" for "Social
Services" in Subsections QXa) and (3).
Cross-References, — Enforcement of support provisions by Department of Human Services, § 62A-1-111.
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UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY

78-45a-2

78-45a-2. Enforcement.
Paternity may be determined upon the petition of the mother, child, putative father, or the public authority chargeable by law with the support of the
child. If paternity has been determined or has been acknowledged according to
the laws of this state, the liabilities of the father may be enforced in the same
or other proceedings:
(1) by the mother, child, or the public authority that has furnished or
may furnish the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses; and
(2) by other persons including private agencies to the extent that they
have furnished the reasonable expenses of pregnancy, confinement, education, necessary support, or funeral expenses.
History: L. 1965, ch. 158, f 2; 1990, ch.
245, t 23.
Amendment Notes. — The 1990 amendment, effective April 23,1990, inserted "putative father" in the first sentence and made
minor stylistic changes.
Cross-References. — Enforcement of provi-

aions by Department of Human Services,
(-62A-MU.
Office of Recovery Services to perform duties
of Department of Human Services in collecting
child support, § 62A-11-104.
Public support of children, §§ 62A-11-301 to
62A-11-332.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Right to counsel

ANALYSIS

Estoppel and laches.
Evidence.
—Conception and birth.
Right to counsel.
—Indigent prisoners.
Blood tests.
Discretion of court.
Standard of proof.
—Preponderance of evidence.
Estoppel and laches.
Under appropriate circumstances, laches
may bar an action for paternity. Borland v.
Chandler, 733 P.2d 144 (Utah 1987).
A paternity action brought six years after
the birth of the child was not barred by laches,
where defendant made no factual showing to
support his argument that he was prejudiced
by the delay. Borland v. Chandler, 733 P.2d
144 (Utah 1987).
Evidence.
—Conception and birth.
Where child was conceived while mother was
married to her first husband and born while
she was married to her second husband, the
child was legitimate whichever husband was
the father, and testimony by mother that disputed second husband's fatherhood and supported first husband's fatherhood would not
illegitimize the child and was properly admissible in paternity action against first husband.
Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640 (Utah 1982).

—Indigent prisoners.
Blood tests.
While due process does not require Utah to
appoint counsel for all indigent prisoners who
are defendants in paternity cases, there may be
some complicated paternity suits in which the
risks of error would be high enough that the
presumption against the right to appointed
counsel would be overcome; given the availability and quality of the blood tests, there is
no need for appointment of counsel prior to the
time the tests are given. Nordgren v. Mitchell,
716 FM 1335 (10th Cir. 1983).
——Discretion of court
Due process of law does not require that all
indigent, incarcerated defendants in paternity
actions must always be appointed counsel;
whether due process requires the appointment
of counsel in such cases is vested in the discretion of the trial court Nordgren v. Mitchell,
624 F. Supp. 242 (D. Utah 1981), aflTd, 716 F.2d
1335 (10th Cir. 1983).
Standard of proof.
—Preponderance of evidence.
The applicable standard of proof where paternity is asserted is "by a preponderance of
the evidence." Roods v. Roods, 645 P.2d 640
(Utah 1982).
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UNIFORM ACT ON PATERNITY

78-45a-5

78-45a-5. Remedies.
(1) The district court has jurisdiction of an action under this act and all
remedies for the enforcement of judgments for expenses of pregnancy and
confinement for a wife or for education, necessary support, or funeral expenses
for legitimate children apply. The court has continuing jurisdiction to modify
or revoke a judgment for future education and necessary support. All remedies under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, are available
for enforcement of duties of support under this act.
(2) The obligee may enforce his right of support against the obligor and the
state Department of Human Services may proceed on behalf of the obligee or
in its own behalf pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title to
enforce that right of support against the obligor. In such actions by the department, all the provisions of Chapter 45b of this title shall be equally applicable
to this chapter. Whenever a court action is commenced by the state Department of Human Services, it shall be the duty of the attorney general or the
county attorney, of the county of residence of the obligee, to represent that
department.
Compiler's Notes. — Chapter 45b of this
History: L-1965, ch. 158,1 5; 1975, ch. 96,
§ 24; 1990, ch. 183,ft60.
title, referred to in Subsection (2), was repealed
Amendment Notes, — The 1990 amend- by Laws 1988, ch. 1, $ 407. For present compament, effective April 23, 1990, substituted rable provisions, see 15 62A-11-301 through
"Human Services" for "Social Services" twice 62A-11-328.
in Subsection (2).
Cross-References. — Creation of DepartMeaning of ,t thii act" — See note under
ment of Human Services, ( 62A-1-102.
same catchline following { 78-45a-4.
General duties of attorney general, § 67*5-1.
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of
General duties of county attorney, § 17*18-1.
Support A c t — The Uniform Reciprocal En*
forcement of Support Act, referred to in the
General jurisdiction of district court,
last sentence in Subsection (1), is Chapter 31 of I 78-3-4.
Title 77.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Jurisdiction.

Interests of mother and state.
Jurisdiction.
—Minority of putative father.
Powers of the court.
Interests of mother and state.
In an action pursuant to the Uniform Act on
Paternity, the state has a separate interest
from that of the mother. The state and the
mother are not in privity because each has separate interests and legal rights over which the
other has no control. State ex rel. State Dept of
Social Servs. v. Ruscetta, 742 P.2d 114 (Utah
Ct App. 1987).

—Minority of putative father.
District court, and not the juvenile court, has
jurisdiction over action brought under the Uniform Act on Paternity, when the putative father is a minor. State ex rel. Utah State Dep*t
of Social Servs. v. Dick, 684 ?M 42 (Utah
1984).
Powers of the court
The Uniform Paternity Act does not endow a
district court with subject matter jurisdiction
to terminate the parent-child relationship or to
permanently relieve a parent of his or her support obligations. Fauver v. Hansen, 803 P*2d
1275 (Utah Ct App. 1990).
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PUBLIC ASSISTANCE

62A-9-121

(3) For the purpose of providing assistance to persons subjected to extraordinary problems of living, by reason of any special situation,
monthly payments may be made within rules devised to meet those situations, such as an allowance to meet the special needs of pregnant women.
(4) Because of the unpredictability of public assistance and medical
benefits, the governor is authorized to supplement the annual appropriation at the close of any fiscal year for medical benefits or public assistance, by deficit spending in an amount not exceeding 2% of the total
work program of federal and state funds allocated for thefiscalyear; and
the Legislature, at its next annual general session, shall appropriate any
supplemental funds that the governor may have authorized for medical
benefits or public assistance.
History: C. 1953,62A-9-119, enacted by L.
1988, ch. 1, | 236; 1988, ch. 342, t 24.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Constitutionality.
Provision of former statute whereby larger
femilies were paid disproportionately smaller
percentage of actual need than smaller families was consistent with the Social Security Act

and not invidious discrimination in violation of
equal protection clause of Fourteenth Amendtnent of United States Constitution. Utah Welfare Rights Org. v. Lindsay, 315 F. Supp. 294
(D. Utah 1970).

62A-9-120. Calculation of General Assistance Grants.
Grants for General Assistance made pursuant to Subsections 62A-9-114(2)
and (3), to the extent that those payments are made on an ongoing basis for
persons who are unemployable, shall be calculated in a manner analogous to
that provided in Subsections 62A-9-119(l), (2), and (3). However, the ratable
reduction for General Assistance may differfromthat imposed on other programs.
History: C. 1953,62A-M20, enacted by L.
1988, ck 1, § 237; 1988, ch. 242, I 25.

62A-9-121. Assignment of support.
(1) The department shall accept an assignment of supportfromeach applicant or recipient regardless of whether its payment is court ordered. Any right
to supportfromany other person which has accrued at the time the assignment is executed or, if none is executed, at the time of application for assistance, and which an applicant or recipient has in his own behalf, or in behalf
of any other family member for whom the applicant or recipient is applying
for or receiving assistance, passes to the department under the assignment or
by operation of law upon the receipt of assistance by the recipient, even if the
recipient has not executed and delivered an assignment to the department.
(2) An assignment of support or a passing ofrightsby operation of law shall
include payments ordered, decreed, or adjudged by any court within this state,
any other state, or territory of the United States and is not in lieu of, and shall
not supersede or alter, any other court order, decree, or judgment.
(3) When an assignment is executed, the applicant or recipient is entitled to
regular monthly assistance and the support paid the department is a refund.
273

DIVORCE

30-3-5

30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed.
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 230, § 4 repeals
these sections, as last amended by L. 1989, ch.
104, §§ 2 to 5, providing for the appointment,

authority, duties, and jurisdiction of court commissioners, effective April 23, 1990.

30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health
care of parties and children — Division of debts
— Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Custody and visitation — Termination of alimony —
Nonmeritorious petition for modification — Meritorious petition for modification [Effective until
January 1, 1994].
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties.
The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce:
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children;
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental
care insurance for the dependent children; and
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5:
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment
of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or
incurred during marriage;
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or
obligees, regarding the court's division
of debts, obligations, or liabilities and regarding the parties9 separate, current addresses; and
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders.
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circumstances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or
training of the custodial parent.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the distribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and necessary.
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of
the child.
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically terminates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if
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ADDENDUM B:

Order Compelling Intervention

COPY
JAN GRAHAM #1231
ATTORNEY GENERAL
BY: Karma K. Dixon #1258
Assistant Attorney General
120 North 200 West, 4th Floor
P. 0. Box 1980
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-1980
Telephone: (801)538-4660

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT

CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,

]
ORDER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case No. 930003184CV

REYES VALENTINO CORDOVA,
Defendant.

JUDGE

WILLIAM S. THORNE

This matter came before the court June 28, 1993 pursuant to
the MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO JOINDER AND REQUEST FOR HEARING
filed by the State of Utah, Department of Human Services, Office of
Recovery Services, the Honorable William A. Thome, presiding* The
Department

was

represented

Attorney General•
nor

represented

by

Blaine

R.

Ferguson, Assistant

The defendant was neither personally present,
by

counsel.

The

Plaintiff,

Child

Support

Enforcement, was represented by Stephen L. Johnston.
The court, having heard argument of counsel, having reviewed

the pleadings on file and being fully apprised therein,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED,
1.

The Circuit court has jurisdiction over delinquent child

support payments.
2. The State of Utah is a party needed for just adjudication
and therefore unless the State waives its rights to any relief
awarded in the present action, the State of Utah, Department of
Human Services is joined as an involuntary plaintiff.
3. The affidavit filed by Child Support Enforcement fails to
meet the statutory requirements and therefore the motion for
default judgment is denied.
4.

The Circuit court does not have jurisdiction to find the

defendant in contempt of a judgment rendered by a district court
and therefore the motion for a finding of contempt is denied.
DATED this

\' "~day of

%± -> f

^

^ 1993.

WILLIAM Ar ^HORWE.
Dl S.tri ct^ Court > Jirage
Vv

-—~ s

•"-« —

'

y

'*. •' • *"

.*'•

*•>,%..

.V"

,y

CERTIFICATE""6F' MAILiNG

I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy of the
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW and ORDER postage prepaid to
the following:
Stephen L. Johnston
Attorney for Child Support Enforcement
P.O. Box 748
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110

ADDENDUM C:

Decision

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, WEST VALLEY DEPARTMENT,
STATE OF UTAH
*

CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,
Plaintiff,

*
*

VS.

*
*
*

REYES VALENTINO CORDOVA,
Defendant.

*
*
*

DECISION

Case No. 930003184cv
Judge: William A. Thorne

On June 6, 1989, the Third District Court, Salt Lake County
rendered a judgment against the defendant, Reyes Valentino Cordova,
ordering him to pay child support to Cheryl E. Duran. Mr. Cordova
has failed to make the required child support payments. Ms. Duran
assigned to Child Support Enforcement (CSE), a private collection
agency, her rights to specified months of the now delinquent
support payments.
In the present action CSE, as assignee, filed a complaint in
the Third Circuit Court, West Valley Department against Mr. Cordova
to recover the delinquent support payments assigned by Ms. Duran.
CSE seeks a finding that Mr. Cordova is in contempt of the district
court's judgment. Mr. Cordova has failed to file any pleading in
the present action.

CSE seeks a default judgment against Mr.

Cordova for the assigned child support and the finding of contempt.
In an effort to comply with Utah Code Ann. 5 78-45-9, CSE
filed an affidavit stating that the assignor, Ms. Duran, did not
receive public assistance during the period of time for which the
assigned child support payments were due.

Also pursuant to Utah

Code Ann. S 78-45-9, CSE filed a motion to add the State of Utah,

Department of Human Services as a plaintiff to the present action.
The State filed a memorandum in opposition to plaintiff's motion
arguing that the circuit court does not have subject matter
jurisdiction over the action and that therefore the court has no
power to join the State to the present action.

CSE responded to

the State's memorandum and argued that the circuit court does have
subject matter jurisdiction over the action. A hearing was held at
the Third Circuit Court, West Valley Department regarding the
joinder of the State as an additional plaintiff.
Johnston represented Child Support Enforcement.

Stephen L

Jeffery C

Hunt

represented the State.
ADEQUACY OF THE AFFIDAVIT
The affidavit submitted by CSE does not meet the requirements
of Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-9.

The statute requires that an

affidavit be submitted stating whether public assistance has been
or is being provided.1

The affidavit submitted by CSE states only

that the assignor did not receive public assistance during a
certain period of time (April 1989 through March 1993).

It fails

to state whether the assignor has received public assistance before
the specified dates or whether public assistance is currently being
received.

CSE has failed to meet the statutory requirements.

Therefore, the motion for default judgment is denied.

The matter

may be reconsidered if an affidavit which complies with Utah Code
Ann. S 78-45-9 is filed with the court.

Utah Code Ann. S 78-45-9(2)(a) (1992).
2

CONTEMPT POWERS
There is no Utah case law deciding whether one court may find
an individual in contempt of another court's judgment.

Several

other states, however, have held that no such power exists.2

A

Louisiana court of appeals stated:
"The court which renders the order commanding the
doing of a certain act by a person or a public body is
alone vested with the right to determine, on a rule for
contempt for failure to comply with the order, whether or
not the order has been complied with, or sufficient
reason given for failure to comply with it."3
The general rule is that only the court which is contemned may
punish for the contempt.4
Although the Utah courts are silent on the issue, Utah
statutory language supports the proposition that only the court
contemned may punish for the contempt. Section 78-7-5 of the Utah
Code states, "Every court has power to compel obedience to its
judgments, orders, and process."5 The negative implication of this
statute is that one court may not find an individual in contempt of
another court's judgment. Section 78-32-1 through 13 also supports
this proposition by granting contempt powers to Utah courts, but
failing to grant any authority to find an individual in contempt of
2

See. In re Marriage of Yossef Alush, 527 N.E.2d 66 (111.
App. Ct. 1988); Johnson v. Perini. 514 N.E.2d 1133 (Ohio Ct. App.
1986); Lane v. Bradley, 339 P.2d 583 (Cal Dist. Ct. App. 1959);
Louisiana ex rel. Connerlv v. Tangipahoa Parish Sch. Dist.. 9 So.
2d 826 (La. Ct. App. 1942).
3

Connerlv. 9 So. 2d at 827.

4

Sge,

5

Utah Code Ann. S 78-7-5(4) (1992) (emphasis added).

17 C.J.S. Contempt § 51 (1963).

3

another court's judgment.6
This reasoning is supported by strong policy issues.

The

court which renders a judgment knows best the specific history and
special circumstances of the case.

The ordering court is best

situated to decide whether an individual has sufficiently complied
with a judgment or whether the reasons for noncompliance are
adequate.

A court which does not know the specific history or

special circumstances of a judgment is less well situated to decide
the issue of contempt.

Therefore#

for good policy reasons

supported by case law from other states and a reasonable reading
and interpretation of Utah statutes, this court finds that it does
not have jurisdiction to find contempt of a district court
judgment.

The motion for a finding of contempt is denied.
JURISDICTION OP THE CIRCUIT COURTS

Circuit courts have jurisdiction over civil matters involving
less than $20,000.00 unless the jurisdiction has been removed by
legislative action.

The State of Utah, through the Attorney

General's Office, urges this court to find that this court does not
have jurisdiction to collect delinquent child support.
In deciding whether child support payments are negotiable,
Utah courts have decided that delinquent child support payments may
be distinguished from on-going child support payments.

6

Utah Code Ann. §S 78-32-1 to -13 (1992).
4

"Support money can fall into two separate categories:
First, the current and ongoing right of a child to
receive support money from his father (parent); and
second, the right to receive reimbursement
for support of
a child after that has been done."7
The courts also state that the reimbursement for delinquent support
payments belongs to whomever furnished the support and "is subject
to negotiation, settlement, satisfaction or discharge in the same
manner as any other debt."8 Circuit courts have civil jurisdiction
over matters in which the sum claimed is less than $20,000 dollars.9
There being no statutory prohibition to the collection of this
debt, it may be collected in the circuit court. Assigned day care
arrears may also be collected in the circuit court under the same
reasoning.
The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provide courts with the
power to join parties to an action who are "needed for just
adjudication."10

To decide whether a party is needed for just

adjudication, the court considers several issues. First, the court
decides whether the party to be joined is subject to service of
process

and whether

subject matter

jurisdiction

is proper.11

Second, the court decides whether complete relief can be accorded

7

Baqqs v. Anderson, 528 P.2d 141, 143 (1974).

9

Utah Code Ann. S 78-4-7 (1992).

10

Utah R. Civ. P. 19.

u

lOt.
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in the party's absence.12

Third, the court decides whether the

party to be joined claims an interest in the action and if so,
whether as a practical matter the party's ability to protect its
interest will be impaired or impeded, or leave any other party
subject

to

a

substantial

risk

of

multiple

or

inconsistent

obligations.13
In the present action the State meets all the criteria of a
party needed for just adjudication.

First, they are subject to

service of process and do not deprive the circuit court of subject
matter jurisdiction.

Second, the State by statute is assigned a

right to delinquent child support payments when a custodial parent
receives public assistance.14

With the State absent CSE could not

be accorded complete relief of its own assigned rights.

Third,

from this statutory assignment, the State gains an interest in the
present action. If the State is absent,. CSE may be awarded relief
without regard for the State's interest which would impair and
impede as a practical matter the State's ability to protect its
interest. Further, the defendant, Mr. Cordova, runs a substantial
risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations if the State is
awarded relief in the district court and CSE is awarded relief in
the circuit court.

The State is a party needed for the just

adjudication of the present action.

13
14

Therefore, the circuit court

X<L.
Utah Code Ann. S 62A-9-121(l) 1992
6

may join the State in the present action as a plaintiff, defendant,
or involuntary plaintiff .l5
The State objects to being joined.

The Department of Human

Services appearing through the Attorney General feels adequately
represented in the district court and for reasons of economy and
convenience to its office does not wish to be joined. If the State
does not wish to be joined, it may waive its right to any relief
awarded in the present action.

By so doing, it forfeits its

interest in this action and is not needed for just adjudication.
Otherwise, the State is a proper party and may be joined upon
motion of the plaintiff.

Therefore, unless the State waives its

right, the State of Utah, Department of Human Services is joined as
an additional plaintiff.
It is therefore ordered:
1.

That the affidavit filed by Child Support Enforcement fails to

meet the statutory requirements and therefore the motion for
default judgment is denied.
2.

That the circuit court does not have jurisdiction to find the

defendant in contempt of a judgment rendered by a district court
and therefore the motion for .a finding of contempt is denied.
3.

That the circuit court has jurisdiction over delinquent child

support payments and day care arrears, that the State is a party
needed for just adjudication, and therefore unless the State waives
its rights to any relief awarded in the present action, the State

w

id*
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of Utah, Department of Human Services is joined as an additional
plaintiff.

DATED this

/ / •

day of

/ . CIRCUIT COURT JUi

